Many adoptees face a number of challenges relating to separation from biological parents during the adoption process, including issues concerning identity, intimacy, attachment, and trust, as well as language and other cultural challenges. One common health challenge faced by adoptees involves lack of access to genetic-relative family health history. Lack of GRFHx represents a disadvantage due to a reduced capacity to identify diseases and recommend appropriate screening for conditions for which the adopted person may be at increased risk. In this (...) article, we draw out common features of traditionally understood “health disparities” in order to identify analogous features in the context of adoptees’ lack of GRFHx. (shrink)

Throughout his philosophical career Thomas Reid was an opponent of scepticism. When providing some remarks on his philosophical development he informs us that initially he accepted Berkeley’s version of the theory of ideas, thinking it adequately secured knowledge of ordinary things and events, until Hume demonstrated the sceptical problems with knowledge of the self encountered by the doctrine. This led to Reid’s re-examination and ultimate rejection of the theory of ideas.

In recent years renewed interest in Thomas Reid's philosophy has led to fruitful discussion of Reid's theories of sensation and perception. Although certain aspects of these topics can be discussed without setting out Reid's version of the primary-secondary quality distinction, the ultimate evaluation of Reid's work on both sensation and perception requires discussion of his views on primary and secondary qualities. Current Reid literature virtually ignores this important topic. This paper is an attempt to remedy this situation. In addition (...) to setting out Reid's position on primary and secondary qualities I will discuss Reid's curious relation to the New Science of his day and will explain how Reid thought he could reintroduce the primary-secondary quality distinction despite Berkeley's attacks on the doctrine.In both of his major works, An Inquiry Into The Human Mind, and Essays On The Intellectual Powers Of Man, Thomas Reid was intent upon examining the philosophical problems of human knowledge. In the Inquiry perception received his exclusive attention. In the Essays other cognitive operations were examined as well. The impetus for these investigations was provided by Reid's negative assessment of the achievements of his philosophical predecessors. (shrink)

O presente artigo visa apresentar o carácter negativo do conhecimento humano de Deus, de acordo com S. Tomás de Aquino. Tal dá-se por causa do objecto próprio do conhecimento intelectual humano e por causa da transcendência de Deus, que está acima de tudo o que existe e que podemos apreender. Esta característica do conhecimento humano de Deus afecta mesmo a revelação divina e a sagrada doutrina. Com efeito, se a revelação alarga o alcance do conhecimento humano, não lhe altera o (...) modo de proceder. Por outro lado, a sagrada doutrina visa "salvar o mistério divino", sem pretender compreendê-lo: sicut ignoto conjungitur. /// The aim of this article is to present the negative character of the human knowledge of God according to St. Thomas Aquinas. This happens because of the object of the intellectual human knowledge and because of the transcendence of God, who is above all that exists and that we can apprehend. This characteristic of God's human knowledge affects even divine revelation and sacred doctrine. Indeed, if revelation widens the scope of human knowledge, it does not change its way of proceeding. On the other hand, sacred doctrine aims "to save divine mystery", without intending to comprehend it: sicut ignoto conjungitur. (shrink)

The earlier volume in this series dealt with two religions of Indian origin, namely, Buddhism and Jainism. The Indian religious scene, however, is characterized by not only religions which originated in India but also by religions which entered India from outside India and made their home here. Thus religious life in India has been enlivened throughout its history by the presence of religions of foreign origin on its soil almost from the very time they came into existence. This volume covers (...) three such religions—Zoraoastrianism, Judaism, and Islam. In the case of Zoraostianism, even its very beginnings are intertwined with India, as Zoroastrianism reformed a preexisting religion which had strong links to the Vedic heritage of India. This relationship took on a new dimension when a Zoroastrian community, fearing persecution in Persia after its Arab conquest, sought shelter in western India and ultimately went on to produce India’s pioneering nationalist in the figure of Dadabhai Naoroji ( 1825-1917), also known as the Grand Old Man of India. Jews found refuge in south India after the destruction of the Temple by the Romans in 70 C.E. and have remained a part of the Indian religious scene since then, some even returning to Israel after it was founded in 1948. Islam arrived in Kerala as soon as it was founded and one of the earliest mosques in the history of Islam is found in India. Islam differs from the previously mentioned religions inasmuch as it went on to gain political hegemony over parts of the country for considerable periods of time, which meant that its impact on the religious life of the subcontinent has been greater compared to the other religions. It has also meant that Islam has existed in a religiously plural environment in India for a longer period than elsewhere in the world so that not only has Islam left a mark on India, India has also left its mark on it. Indeed all the three religions covered in this volume share this dual feature, that they have profoundly influenced Indian religious life and have also in turn been profoundly influenced by their presence in India. (shrink)

The earlier volume in this series dealt with two religions of Indian origin, namely, Buddhism and Jainism. The Indian religious scene, however, is characterized by not only religions which originated in India but also by religions which entered India from outside India and made their home here. Thus religious life in India has been enlivened throughout its history by the presence of religions of foreign origin on its soil almost from the very time they came into existence. This volume covers (...) three such religions—Zoraoastrianism, Judaism, and Islam. In the case of Zoraostianism, even its very beginnings are intertwined with India, as Zoroastrianism reformed a preexisting religion which had strong links to the Vedic heritage of India. This relationship took on a new dimension when a Zoroastrian community, fearing persecution in Persia after its Arab conquest, sought shelter in western India and ultimately went on to produce India’s pioneering nationalist in the figure of Dadabhai Naoroji ( 1825-1917), also known as the Grand Old Man of India. Jews found refuge in south India after the destruction of the Temple by the Romans in 70 C.E. and have remained a part of the Indian religious scene since then, some even returning to Israel after it was founded in 1948. Islam arrived in Kerala as soon as it was founded and one of the earliest mosques in the history of Islam is found in India. Islam differs from the previously mentioned religions inasmuch as it went on to gain political hegemony over parts of the country for considerable periods of time, which meant that its impact on the religious life of the subcontinent has been greater compared to the other religions. It has also meant that Islam has existed in a religiously plural environment in India for a longer period than elsewhere in the world so that not only has Islam left a mark on India, India has also left its mark on it. Indeed all the three religions covered in this volume share this dual feature, that they have profoundly influenced Indian religious life and have also in turn been profoundly influenced by their presence in India. (shrink)

This collection of essays, offered in honor of the distinguished career of prominent political philosophy professor Clifford Orwin, brings together internationally renowned scholars to provide a wide context and discuss various aspects of the virtue of “humanity” through the history of political philosophy.

This collection of essays, offered in honor of the distinguished career of prominent political philosophy professor Clifford Orwin, brings together internationally renowned scholars to provide a wide context and discuss various aspects of the virtue of “humanity” through the history of political philosophy.

Physicians generally recommend that patients resuscitated with naloxone after opioid overdose stay in the emergency department for a period of observation in order to prevent harm from delayed sequelae of opioid toxicity. Patients frequently refuse this period of observation despiteenefit to risk. Healthcare providers are thus confronted with the challenge of how best to protect the patient’s interests while also respecting autonomy, including assessing whether the patient is making an autonomous choice to refuse care. Previous studies have shown that physicians (...) have widely divergent approaches to navigating these conflicts. This paper reviews what is known about the effects of opioid use disorder on decision-making, and argues that some subset of these refusals are non-autonomous choices, even when patients appear to have decision making capacity. This conclusion has several implications for how physicians assess and respond to patients refusing medical recommendations after naloxone resuscitation. (shrink)

There is a remarkable trend in contemporary environmentalism that emphasizes ‘accepting responsibility’ for the natural world in contrast to outdated preservationist thinking that shirks such responsibility. This approach is often explained and justified by reference to the anthropocene: this fundamentally new epoch—defined by human domination—requires active human intervention to avert planetary catastrophe. However, in this paper, I suggest this rhetoric encourages a flight from history. This often jubilant, sometimes anxious, yearning for unprecedented human innovation and—ultimately—control in our new millennia mirrors (...) the Futurist movement that took off near the beginning of the last century. Despite the significant differences in the details of how academics have defended this twenty-first-century environmental outlook, they all represent the true flight from history; they too quickly jettison the ideas of historical environmentalists and so misunderstand the environmental values at the heart of preservation that are more salient than ever. (shrink)

Childress and coauthors present a case considering ECMO withdrawal over the objection of the conscious patient who is no longer a candidate for transplantation or other definitive therapeutic inter...

What term is most appropriate in describing the limits of medicine? That depends on who determines the limits and the bases on which those limits are delineated and communicated. Schneiderman, Jecker, and Jonsen critique two recent policy statements by critical care providers—Bosslet et al. and Nates et al. —for their rejection of the use of the term futile for treatment. Both statements recommend using the adjective inappropriate for the problematic treatment, rather than futile, based on the lack of consensus of (...) just what constitutes futility. Schneiderman, Jecker, and Jonsen also assert that, despite a lack of consensus about the determination of futility, the definitions they have... (shrink)

In this issue, Raphael Cohen-Almagor reviews some of the terms used in the discussion of bioethical issues at the end of a patient's life; he argues that they are “valueladen” and serve “primarily the physicians, at times at the expense of the patients’ best interest.” Each of the following terms comes under scrutiny: “death with dignity,” “persistent vegetative state,” “futility,” “double effect,” and “brain death.” He argues that these concepts, developed in recent decades, “have generated an unhealthy atmosphere for patients, (...) which might lead to undesirable actions at the end of patients’ lives.” He issues a plea to discontinue the use of the term “persistent vegetative state” because it is dehumanizing, to explain “double effect” and “futility” in detail and with sincerity, and to clarify the motivation for using these terms and others. He warns physicians not to use terminology that is offensive to patients and loved ones or that weakens their patients’ will to live. (shrink)

In this issue, Raphael Cohen-Almagor reviews some of the terms used in the discussion of bioethical issues at the end of a patient's life; he argues that they are “valueladen” and serve “primarily the physicians, at times at the expense of the patients’ best interest.” Each of the following terms comes under scrutiny: “death with dignity,” “persistent vegetative state,” “futility,” “double effect,” and “brain death.” He argues that these concepts, developed in recent decades, “have generated an unhealthy atmosphere for patients, (...) which might lead to undesirable actions at the end of patients’ lives.” He issues a plea to discontinue the use of the term “persistent vegetative state” because it is dehumanizing, to explain “double effect” and “futility” in detail and with sincerity, and to clarify the motivation for using these terms and others. He warns physicians not to use terminology that is offensive to patients and loved ones or that weakens their patients’ will to live. (shrink)

It is now a default obligation to provide cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), in the absence of knowledge of a patient’s or surrogate’s wishes to the contrary. We submit that it is time to reevaluate this position. Attempting CPR should be subject to the same scrutiny demanded of other medical interventions that involve balancing a great benefit against grievous harms.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court, after adopting the doctrine of the objective patient standard, expanded it in bold and innovative ways over nearly four decades, until the Wisconsin legislative and executive branches drastically reversed this course. The saga has implications for other jurisdictions considering adoption or expansion of the objective patient standard doctrine.

Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page W15-W16.

The problem of decision-making capacity in patients with dementia, such as those with early stage Alzheimer's, can be vexing, especially when these patients refuse life-sustaining medical treatments. However, these patients should not be presumed to lack decision-making capacity. Instead, an analysis of the patient's decision-making capacity should be made. Patients who have some degree of decision-making capacity may be able to make a choice about life-sustaining medical treatment and may, in many cases, choose to forgo treatment.

From computerized medical records to databases of pharmacological interactions and automated provisional EKG readings, the emergence of information technology has significantly altered the practice of medicine. Information technology has been widely used to enhance diagnosis and treatment and to improve communication between providers. The advent of the Internet also brings far-reaching implications for patient–physician communication, challenging physicians, patients, and policymakers to consider its impact on the delivery of medical care and the therapeutic relationship. A new set of practices by patients (...) and physicians is unfolding in cyberspace, ranging from the use of e-mail to communicate between physicians and patients in an existing relationship to one-to-one consultations with an anonymous physician and ongoing online treatment, such as psychotherapy. These practices are emerging in both the for-profit and not-for-profit spheres. (shrink)

This paper is a critical analysis of David Rayfield's attempt to distinguish true from correct descriptions of human actions (Inquiry, Vol. 13 [1970], Nos. 1?2). It is argued that the analysis fails to do the job required of it for two reasons. First, the analysis of true descriptions is circular insofar as it turns on the notion of an ?unbound action?. Secondly, and independent of the charge of circularity, it is shown that the basis upon which Rayfield draws the true?correct (...) distinction leads to certain unacceptable consequences for action theory. (shrink)

This book presents Robert S. Hartman’s formal theory of value and critically examines many other twentieth century value theorists in its light, including A.J. Ayer, Kurt Baier, Brand Blanshard, Paul Edwards, Albert Einstein, William K. Frankena, R.M. Hare, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, G.E. Moore, P.H. Nowell-Smith, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Charles Stevenson, Paul W. Taylor, Stephen E. Toulmin, and J.O. Urmson.